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POINT I 
The customer pricing developed by Keil while at WEST was not a 
trade secret and Keil's delivery of those prices by letter to three 
existing WEST customers was not a misappropriation of a trade 
secret and the evidence in the Trial did not preponderate such a 
factual finding and the Trial Court erred in refusing to determine 
that such was the case as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
The evidence did not preponderate at trial that there was a nexus 
between the activity of Keil with customers of WEST which 
caused damage to WEST and the Court further compounded the 
jury error by failing failing to either direct or set aside the verdict. 
TTT 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
WATER & ENERGY SYSTEMS : 
TECHNOLOGY, INC. BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
A Utah Corporation, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant : 
Vs. : 
STEVEN L. KEIL, and :Appellate No. 20000468-SC 
BRODY CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC. : Priority: 15 
A Utah Corporation, 
Defendants/Appellants : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is a direct appeal from a decision by Judge Rodney S. Page of the 
Second Judicial District Court, sitting with a jury, in which judgment was 
entered jointly and severely against the Defendants in the amount of 
$188,675.00. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to §78-2-
2(3)(j) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). Priority is 15. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that the 
Defendants misappropriated Plaintiffs prices? The Standard of Review in 
reviewing any jury award of damages is whether there is a sufficient basis for 
the reviewing court to determine that there is a rational legal basis and a 
sufficient factual basis for the decision. Sampson vs. Richins, 770 P. 2d 998 
(Utah App 1989). 
This issue was preserved in the Trial Court by Defendants' Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (R. 1988) and supporting memorandum 
(R. 1994) and Motion for New Trial or Amendment of Verdict (R. 1986) and 
the supporting memorandum (R. 1994). 
2. Was there sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that the 
Defendants interfered with prospective economic relationships of Plaintiff 
with Alliant Tech, Mag Corp, and Cargill? The Standard of Review is the 
same as set forth under issue number 1 above. 
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This issue was preserved in the Trial Court by Defendants' Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (R. 1988) and supporting memorandum 
(R. 1994) and Motion for New Trial or Amendment of Verdict (R. 1986) and 
the supporting memorandum (R. 1994). 
3. Did the delivery by Defendant Steven L. Keil of letters to Alliant Tech, 
Mag Corp. or Cargil constitute, as a matter of law, a misappropriation of trade 
secrets? The Standard of Review is for correctness and abuse of discretion. 
Drake vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 939 P. 2d 177 (Utah 1997) 
This issue was preserved in the Trial Court by Defendants' Motions for 
Summary Judgment (R. 1422 and 1670) and the supporting memorandums (R. 
1423, 1672 and 1810). 
4. Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to grant Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment prior to the trial with respect to the issue of the 
misappropriation of pricing? The Standard of Review is for correctness. 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.. vs. Garfield County. 811 P. 2d 
184 (Utah 1991). 
This issue was preserved in the Trial Court by Defendants' Motions for 
Summary Judgment (R. 1422 and 1670) and the supporting memorandums (R. 
1423, 1672 and 1810). 
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5. Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to grant Defendants' Motion for 
a Directed Verdict following the presentation of the Plaintiffs case? The 
Standard of Review is that the evidence must be reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the losing party under the Motion and the Reviewing Court must 
determine that there was a reasonable basis to conclude that the losing party 
could prevail. Management Committee of Grey Stone Pines Homeowners 
Association vs. Grey Stone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982 ). 
This issue was preserved in the Trial Court by Defendants' Motion for 
Directed Verdict. (R. 1992.) 
6. Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to grant Defendants' Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or Motion for New Trial or 
Amendment of the Verdict, following the trial. The Standard of Review is 
whether or not the Court was arbitrary and abused its discretion. Smith vs. 
Shreeve, 551 P.2d 1261 (Utah 1976) 
This issue was preserved in the Trial Court by Defendants' Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (R. 1988) and supporting memorandum 
(R. 1994) and Motion for New Trial or Amendment of Verdict (R. 1986) and 
the supporting memorandum (R. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This an appeal from a jury verdict granting judgment for Plaintiff 
against the Defendants in a misappropriation of trade secrets case. The genesis 
of this appeal came from an initial ruling by this Court from an Interlocutory 
Appeal filed by the Defendant Keil in Water & Energy Systems Technology, 
Inc., vs. Steven L. Keil 974 P. 2d 821 (Utah 1999). The Court, after reviewing 
the District Court's granting of a Preliminary Injunction in favor of the 
Plaintiff, reviewed Judge Page's findings and unanimously reversed his 
decision and ruled that Plaintiff had not met the required evidentiary burden of 
demonstrating that either its chemical formulas or pricing had been 
misappropriated by the Defendant Keil either under tort law principles or the 
Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act. §13-24-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended) (see Addendum A). Following that ruling, Defendants moved for 
Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff on all issues. (R. 1422) The Court 
granted Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of misappropriation of 
chemical formula but failed to grant Summary Judgment on the issues of 
misappropriation of the Plaintiffs price list, interference with economic 
relationships and violation of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 
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Following further discovery, Defendants filed a second Motion for 
Summary Judgment(R. 1670) which was denied by the Court on November 15, 
1999. (R. 1841) 
Jury trial commenced on February 23, 2000. At the conclusion of 
Plaintiffs case, Defendants moved for a Directed Verdict pursuant to Rule 58 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court denied that Motion and the 
jury then found in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants pursuant to 
a special interrogatory verdict (see Addendum B) and entered Judgment, 
jointly and severally, against Defendants for $188,675.00. 
Following the verdict, the Defendants filed Motions for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict or for a New Trial and Amendment of Verdict 
which were denied on May 31, 2000. Notice of Appeal to this Court was filed 
on June 1,2000. 
FACTS 
The following factual presentation represents a marshalling of the 
evidence presented both by Plaintiff and Defendants during the proceedings in 
the Trial Court. For ease of reference, the Plaintiff, Water and Energy Systems 
Technology Inc, will be referenced through the remainder of this Brief as 
WEST, the Defendant Steven L. Keil, as Keil and the Defendant Brody 
Chemical Co. Inc. as Brody. References to the pleadings in the record on 
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appeal will be prefaced by the letter R and the pleading itself. References to 
the Trial Transcript will be identified by the letters Tp followed by the page 
number of the transcript. The exhibits which were offered in the trial are 
referred to by the exhibit number. Other major documents will be supplied in 
the Addendum. 
L WEST and Brody are companies operating in the State of Utah who 
develop, market and distribute water treatment chemicals and services to the 
general public. (Tp. 4 and 318] 
2. Keil began employment with WEST as a water treatment chemical 
salesman in 1986. At the time of his employment Keil held a bachelors degree 
in Physics and Math and a Masters Degree in Chemical Engineering with a 
Minor in Chemistry. [Tp. 10-11] 
3. Although Keil had previously worked for Dow Chemical Company, he 
did not specifically work in water treatment and had no training whatsoever in 
the areas of boiler and cooling tower treatment. [Tp. 11] 
4. At no time did Keil sign an agreement stating that if he terminated his 
employment with WEST he would not go to work with any of WEST'S 
competitors and no other non-competition restriction existed contractually 
between WEST and Keil [Tp. 107] 
5. While employed by WEST, the majority of Keil's income was derived 
from sales to the following customers: Hill Air Force Base, Alliant Tech, 
Laidlaw, Mag Corp, Utah State University, EG & G and Cargill Flour. [Tp. 
12-13] 
6. Franklin M. Leaver Jr. was the President of WEST during the entire 
period of Keil's employment. [Tp 4] 
7. Mr. Leaver and Keil testified that the process by which Keil obtained 
customers was that he would use bid sheets and prospect lists that were given 
to him by WEST. Keil would then contact potential customers and develop a 
price and product proposal for each specific customer. [Tp 11 and 309-310] 
Keil did not specifically create the prices but talked with the potential 
customers and returned to the WEST office for suggestions as to what prices 
ought to be charged. Mr. Leaver would then review the assessment and 
evaluate and modify it as he saw fit. [Tp78 and 309-310] Keil was also told 
by Mr. Leaver that the prices being developed for WEST'S products and 
services were to be confidential. There were no price lists published by WEST 
but each customer had specific prices that were individualized for them. No 
comprehensive price list was ever issued by WEST . [Tp 9-10] 
8. When Keil made a proposal to a new customer that had been approved 
by WEST, letters were normally presented signed by Keil indicating pricing on 
a per pound basis with the disclosure of composition concentration and that the 
material was proprietary and confidential and the prospective customer was to 
maintain it as such. [Tp 10] 
9. During his twelve (12) years with WEST, Keil was successful in 
increasing WESTs business. In particular, he fostered good working 
relationships with customers known as Cargill, Alliant Tech and Mag Corp., 
Utah State University, Hill Air Force Base, Union Pacific, EG&G and Laid-
law. [Tp.12-13] 
10. WEST had long term agreements with Cargill, Mag Corp and Alliant 
Tech to purchase various products at certain prices, although these agreements 
were not exclusive and the customers were free to purchase product from other 
suppliers and to terminate the agreement at any time. [Tp. 71-72] 
11. Keil was compensated by WEST using a base salary with commissions 
and received an automobile allowance. [Tp 11-12] 
12. In the summer of 1997, WEST began experiencing problems with the 
Mag Corp account in that the company questioned WEST'S ability to service its 
boiler and ultimately bought products from another company. Keil was in 
charge of the Mag Corp account during this period. [Tp .18] 
13. Shortly thereafter, James Wilson, an employee with Brody for 2 1/2 
years met Keil and discussed with him the concept of coming to work for 
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Brody. Sometime in October of 1997, Keil met Jon Liddiard, the President of 
Brody, and continued discussions about coming to work for Brody. [Tpl37-
138] 
14. Wilson testified that an understanding was reached between Keil and 
Brody sometime between October and November of 1997, that Keil would 
leave WEST and associate himself with Brody, however, no firm agreement 
was reached because Keil needed more time to determine that he could provide 
similar products at competitive pricing for Brody that he had with WEST. [Tp 
139] 
15. During this period, Keil contacted Buckman Laboratories and ultimately 
satisfied himself that he could compete at Brody and determined to leave 
WEST. [Tp 49-50] During this same period, another employee of WEST, 
Greg Offerman, also expressed interest in leaving WEST and going with Brody 
and met with Keil and representatives of Brody on a number of occasions to 
discuss future employment. [Tp. 224-228] 
16. On March 2, 1998, Keil and Offerman informed Mr. Leaver for the first 
time that they were considering employment with Brody. At the time of that 
discussion, Mr. Leaver had no idea the two men had been talking to Brody. 
He asked both men to give him at least two weeks notice and Offerman agreed. 
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The following evening, March 3rd , Keil informed Mr. Leaver that March 2nd 
was his last day and that he would not return. [Tp 27] 
17. Immediately after March 2, 1998, Keil sent letters to six major 
customers of WEST telling them that he was leaving WEST and that he could 
provide the same quality of service and product as a representative of Brody 
with a 10% reduction in price. Keil prepared these letters on Brody's stationery 
on his own computer. One of the letters was dated February 18th but was not 
sent at that time. All of the letters were hand-delivered by Keil to the specific 
customers including Alliant Tech, Mag Corp, and Cargill on or about March 
10th or 11, 1998. [Tp. 348-352] Keil prepared these letters and made the 
proposals based upon knowledge he gained during the time he worked with 
WEST. Keil took no documents with him that set forth pricing but had the 
knowledge of the prices that were developed by Mr. Leaver and him while Keil 
was employed by WEST. [Tp. 350-351] (See Addendum C) 
18. Following Keil's leaving WEST, WEST sent a certified letter requiring 
that Keil return to WEST various proprietary items that he had in his 
possession. [Tp 29] 
19. Mr. Leaver testified that a pager was returned in approximately a week 
to ten days. [Tp 29] Keys were not returned for some time, nor was a Hill Air 
Force Base key and customer files. Ultimately some customer files were 
partially returned although they had no correspondence or service reports in 
them between February of 1996 though March of 1998. [Tp. 29-32] Two price 
sheets were returned, but all other price sheets that WEST claimed Keil 
received and were in his possession were not returned. [Tp 32] Mr. Leaver 
testified that there was still some missing inventory including pricing sheets for 
Alliant Tech and Mag Corp as of the date of the Trial, March 2, 2000. [Tp32] 
20. On March 16, 1998, WEST received a letter from Mag Corp stating that 
"after reviewing recent developments including problems with WEST'S 
representative (Keil)" it decided to select another supplier.(Tp 39-40] 
21. During the trial, representatives of each of the three companies that 
WEST used to establish damages, Cargill, Mag Corp and Alliant Tech, testified 
that they already knew their prices and that Keil only disclosed his knowledge 
of their prices to each of them individually and did not disclose their prices to 
other competitors. [Tp. 166-184-205] Mr. Leaver also testified that there was 
no evidence that Keil gave the prices Alliant Tech was paying for a particular 
product to Mag Corp or to Cargill or visa versa. He also testified that he had 
no contract with the particular parties binding them to purchase only from 
WEST. If they got a better price from someone else, there was nothing to 
prohibit them from buying the product if they felt it would do the job at a better 
price. [Tp70-72] Specifically, each of the representatives of Mag Corp, Allaint 
Tech and Cargill testified that pricing was not the key issue in determining 
whether or not they accepted a particular proposal for water treatment products 
but that a) quality of service and b) the reputation of the service technician 
were most important. [Tp. 168-69, 186-87, 215-216 ] 
22. The President of WEST California, Brent W.Chettell, also testified that 
price was not the most important factor in determining the selection of a water 
chemical treatment supplier and that other considerations such as service, 
technician, and quality of product were of primary importance. [Tp. 267] 
23. None of the representatives of Cargill, Alliant Tech or Mag Corp 
testified that they either stopped utilizing WEST or utilized Brody on the basis 
of price.[Tp. 168-70, 186-90,215-218] 
24. Although Mr. Leaver continued to assert that the letters sent out by Keil 
were inappropriate, he testified that the disclosure by Keil in the letters of the 
prices to the individual companies was not a violation of something he believed 
was proprietary and that the offending portion of the document (letters) was a 
statement that Brody could provide the same or similar products and that 
nothing else violated any of WEST'S proprietary interests. [Tp 115-116] 
25. In one instance, Kathy Vigil of Alliant Tech testified that when Mr. 
Leaver and an associate approached her, after Keil had left WEST and began 
working with Brody, their rudeness and inappropriate behavior caused her to 
13 
determined that Alliant Tech would no longer do business with WEST. [Tp. 
205-208] 
26. Keith Rydalch of Mag Corp testified that he sent a letter dated March 
16 to WEST indicating that "after reviewing recent developments including 
problems with WEST'S representative (Keil)" they decided to select another 
supplier. Rydalch further testified that he thought Keilfs behavior with respect 
to leaving WEST and sending out the letter the day after his termination was 
inappropriate. [Tp. 67-68] 
27. Mr. Leaver testified, based upon WEST'S prior history of sales to Alliant 
Tech, Cargill and Mag Corp. respectively, that in February of 1998, he 
received a two year purchase order from Alliant Tech and anticipated gross 
sales for the two year period would have been $136,419.48 factoring in a gross 
profit margin of 60% thus the damage to WEST because of Alliants failure to 
continue purchasing products and services was $81,851.69. With respect to 
Mag Corp, Mr. Leaver testified the total anticipated growth sales for two years 
was $167,417.25 factoring a 63% profit margin resulting in damages of 
$105,472.87. The projected loss for Cargill under the same theory was $6, 
391.62. [Tp 71-73] (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 29) 
The following facts relate specifically to the District Court proceedings 
concerning various pre-trial, trial, and post-trial motions. 
28. Following this Court's ruling in Water Energy Systems Technology Inc., 
vs. Steven L. Keil Supra on February 19, 1999, the Defendants filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment claiming that the water treatment formulas and the 
price list of the Plaintiff were not trade secrets and had not been 
misappropriated by the Defendants. [See R. 1422] 
29. On July 28, 1999, the Trial Judge ruled "That while there is sufficient 
evidence from which the trier of fact could conclude that the formula and 
price list of Plaintiff were confidential and Defendant Keil was under an 
expressed or implied contract which limited their disclosure. However, in 
order for the Plaintiff to prevail on claim of misappropriation of Plaintiffs 
formula, Plaintiff has to prove that the formulas were the same or that Brody's 
formulas were specifically derived from those of the Plaintiff. No such 
credible evidence has been provided either by testimony at the prior hearing 
or by subsequent affidavit. For that reason, the Court grants Defendant's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of the misappropriation of 
the formulae. The Court further concludes that there remains a question of 
fact as to the misappropriation of Plaintiffs price list, and as to whether the 
Plaintiffs price lists were used by Defendant Keil and Brody in establishing 
their own price lists." Based upon the foregoing, the Trial Court denied 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Addendum D.) 
30. The Defendants filed a second motion for Summary Judgment on 
November 2, 1999. (R. 1670) The Court ruled that there were still contested 
material issues of fact, but limited the WEST's damage claim to the following 
customers: Mag Corp., EG&G, Union Pacific, Hill Air Force Base, Utah 
State University, Cargill Hour, Laidlaw and Alliant Tech Systems. [See 
Addendum E] 
31. After the conclusion of the Plaintiffs case, the Defendants moved for a 
Directed Verdict, R.1992, relying heavily on the case of Microbiological 
Research Corporation vs. Muna, 625 P. 2d 690 (Utah 1981). The Trial Court 
ruled from the bench as follows: " The Court knows that Defendants 
primarily rely on the case (Muna) which was in 1991 case. That subsequent to 
that time in 1989 Utah adopted the Utah Trade Secret Act and that induces 
into the law new issues which in fact are before the Court in the matters which 
have been filed." Judge Page then cited specific provisions of the Act and 
ruled, with respect to the particular definitions of the Act, that there were still 
issues to be determined and if the jury chose to believe everything that was 
presented by way of the Plaintiffs case, they could find a misappropriation of 
a trade secret. The question of damages was, still in fact, one for the jury. 
32. The Trial Court then looked at the intentional interference with 
economic purpose and determined that under tort law WEST would have to 
demonstrate that the Defendants' interference was maliciously motivated in 
the sense of inspired desire to do harm to the Plaintiff for the Defendants' own 
sake and that there has been no such showing. The only basis shown by 
Plaintiff to demonstrate intentional interference was that there was a 
misappropriation of a trade secret by Keil or Brody. The Trial Court also 
eliminated for consideration by the jury any claim for damages except as to 
Alliant Tech, Mag Corp, and Cargill. [Tp 292-293 Bench Ruling] 
33. Following the Trial, the Defendant's timely filed Motions for a New 
Trial, Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Amended Judgment. These 
Motions were argued in a separate hearing on May 2, 2000. Unfortunately the 
Clerk of the Court failed to put a video tape in the machine and the argument 
was not recorded and, therefore, cannot be given to the Court. 
34. The Trial Court's findings with respect to Defendants' post-trial motions 
were entered on May 31, 2000 and in particular stated: 
1. The misappropriation of confidential information by Defendants took 
place, not in the disclosure of Plaintiffs WEST pricing to its own 
customers but rather in a disclosure of WEST pricing to Defendant 
Brody Chemical, an entity separate from Defendant Keil, for the 
purpose of Brody Chemical to compete with WEST. 
2. By Defendant Keil giving that confidential information to Defendant 
Brody Chemical, the trade secret was destroyed. 
3. The pricing information provided to Defendant Brody Chemical did 
not come from Palintiffs WEST's customers but rather directly from 
Defendant Keil. 
4. The damages awarded by the jury were fair and reasonable, and in 
keeping with the evidence presented at trial. 
5. The case of Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 
304 (Utah 1982) is relevant as to setting the standards by which the 
tort of interference with a business relationship is determined. 
[Addendum F ] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that the 
Defendants misappropriated WEST's prices, or that the Defendants interfered 
with prospective economic relationships of WEST in that WEST's pricing was 
not a Trade Secret and that, even if it was, Keil did not destroy the Trade 
Secret because it was only disclosed to those who already knew the prices. 
There is no nexus between the delivery by Keil of letters indicating price 
reductions to Cargill, Mag Corp and Alliant Tech and any damage claimed by 
WEST, in that none of these entities made decisions with respect to the 
continuation of their relationships with WEST based upon pricing nor did 
WEST have exclusive agreements that the companies buy only from them. 
The Trial Court drove this case to its unjust conclusion by failing to 
grant Defendants' motions prior to, during and post-trial in accordance with 




THE CUSTOMER PRICING DEVELOPED BY KEIL 
WHILE AT WEST WAS NOT A TRADE SECRET AND 
KEIL'S DELIVERY OF THOSE PRICES BY LETTER TO 
THREE EXISTING WEST CUSTOMERS WAS NOT A 
MISAPPROPRIATION OF A TRADE SECRET AND THE 
EVIDENCE IN THE TRIAL DID NOT PURPONDERATE 
SUCH A FACTUAL FINDING AND THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRERD IN REFUSING TO DETERMINE THAT SUCH 
WAS THE CASE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Keil and Brody did not misappropriate a Trade Secret of WEST. The 
gravaman of this case lies in this Court's decision reversing the Trial Court's 
entry of an Injunction against Keil at the initial stages of this litigation. In 
that Interlocutory Appeal, while the focus of the Court was on whether or not 
the Trial Court had properly issued an Injunction against Keil, the Court 
recognized basic principles that should have been applied to this case by the 
Trial Court during the entirety of the litigation. This Court recognized that the 
leading case in this area is Microbiological Research Corp vs. Muna. Supra 
which creates the standards for establishing a claim for the misappropriation 
of Trade Secrets. Interestingly, the Trial Court in its denial of a Motion for 
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denial of a Motion for Directed Verdict after the presentation of WEST's case 
made a specific reference to the fact that, in effect, the Muna case was 
trumped by the statutory provisions of the Utah Trade Secrets Act, Utah Code 
Annotated §13-24-1 et seq. (1953, as amended) 
What WEST never recognized and apparently neither did the Trial 
Court, was that this Court was well aware of the existence of the above 
referenced statute and did not in any way limit or distinguish Muna as the 
leading case establishing the standards by which the existence or non-
existence of a Trade Secret would be determined in this state. 
After this Court's February 19, 1999, decision, Keil and Brody filed the 
first of a succession of motions to have the Trial Court terminate the litigation 
on the basis that WEST had no claim, as a matter of law. In its ruling on 
Defendant's first Motion for Summary Judgment, the Trial Court correctly 
concluded that WEST could not proceed on its claim that Keil had 
misappropriated its chemical formulas, however, it left the pricing issue to be 
determined at Trial. Following that ruling, the entire focus of the litigation 
was on pricing. 
It is important to note that no generalized lists showing the prices of 
WEST'S products were ever provided in any of the pre-trial motions. In fact, 
no price sheets were produced in the Trial by WEST. WEST'S position was 
that they were taken away and not returned. Keil denied this, and testified that 
all he took away was his knowledge of the prices. Tp. 350-351] 
What is clear and unrefuted from all of the testimony at Trial was that 
each of WEST'S client's prices were developed on an individual basis. The 
common practice, according to Mr. Leaver, was that Keil would meet with the 
prospective customer, review its water chemical treatment needs and return 
and discuss the same with Mr. Leaver and others to determine appropriate 
pricing for the services and products to be provided. Keil in fact testified that 
he developed the bulk of the prices, but Mr. Leaver indicated that all prices 
were subject to his final approval. [Tp. 391] At the time of Keil's termination, 
Keil knew WEST'S prices not from a price list but from his direct contact with 
the customer over twelve years. Each pricing scheme was individualized to 
the particular customer and was known both to Keil and WEST and most 
importantly to the each customer. WEST directed its customers to maintain 
the integrity of the process by keeping the prices confidential from other 
customers. 
The evidentiary focus of the Trial concentrated on three specific WEST 
customers identified as Cargill, Mag Corp and Alliant Tech. Representatives 
of each of those entities, to wit: Keith Ridalch of Mag Corp, Rich Henderson 
of Cargill and Kathleen Vigil of Alliant Tech, all testified that they knew the 
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prices they paid for WEST'S products and that they did not know the pricing 
that other customers paid for the same products. In their discussions, Keil 
simply repeated back each customer's prices with a proposal for a 10% 
reduction if they changed to Brody. Each customer was aware of what it paid 
for WEST's products. There was no evidence produced at Trial showing that 
Keil disclosed these prices to Brody and that Brody used them to compete 
with WEST. The only evidence of any disclosure of WEST's pricing was the 
three letters sent respectively to Cargill, Mag Corp and Alliant Tech. 
(Addendum C) 
These letters are self explanatory but simply demonstrate Keil's 
knowledge of WEST's pricing and his ability to better WEST's pricing by 
approximately 10%. There was also no evidence presented by any witness 
that Keil disclosed WEST's pricing of products to Cargil to Alliant Tech, or 
Mag Corp or visa versa or to any other party, including Brody. The only 
disclosure presented to the jury was the information contained in the three 
letters and the discussions Keil had with representatives of the three customers 
about the pricing. 
This becomes important when one examines the following specific 
language of Muna: 
A secret may not be in a public domain if extensive effort is 
required to pierce its veil by assembling the literature concerning 
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it and thereby uncover its parts. If this can be readily done by one 
who is normally skilled in the field and has a reasonable 
familiarity with its trade literature, the secret may no longer be 
entitled to protection as such. An employer to obtain relief must 
establish that his former employee's product (in this case the 
pricing) is a copy of his own product, that its method or 
production was secret, and that the former employee has used or 
intends to use confidential information acquired during his 
employment. Id at 696.... Upon termination of his employment, 
an employee has the prerogative to use his general knowledge, 
experience, memory and skill, however gained, provided he does 
not use, disclose, or impinge upon any of the secret processes or 
business secrets of his former employer. The distinction between 
general and special knowledge can only be resolved by a 
balancing of the conflicting social and economic interests of two 
desirable goals.... Confidential information of the employer, 
however, loses any protection to which it may have been entitled 
after it had been merged into the employee's own faculties, skill 
and experience. Since experience is something a man acquires, a 
standard must be found to test whether, in a particular case, an 
employee's experience is such as will permit of its use at the 
termination of the employment, even though it may prove 
detrimental to his former employer. Id. at 676 and 697. 
A case involving the determination of whether a policyholder list was a 
Trade Secret and could not therefore be used by an agent who left the 
company and went to work for someone else. Harvest Life Ins Co vs. Getche 
701 N.E. P. 2d 871 (Ind. App. 1998) In that case, the Court held that 
the rationale which has been followed in these cases is that 
the information could be obtained from the policyholder himself, 
from the policy, or from other materials provided to the 
policyholder by the insurance company. This Court observed 
about College Life Insurance Company of America, in a footnote 
in steenhoven, 460 N.E.2d at 975, what we observe today about 
Harvest. Harvest seems to seek to prevent competition by its 
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former agent more than it seeks to protect a trade secret.] Id. at 
876 
In this case, Keil cannot be expected to purge from his own knowledge 
pricing for products which he himself developed for various customers of 
WEST. The interesting dichotomy in this case is that had Keil never sent the 
letters, but simply approached Alliant, Cargil and Mag Corp and gave them a 
bid on behalf of Brody which he knew to be 10% under WEST because of the 
general knowledge he took with him after leaving, Plaintiff would have had no 
evidence of any purported Trade Secrets of misappropriation of claim secrets. 
The fact is however, that the letters merely memorialize in written form what 
Keil already knew in his mind and this conduct is not prohibited by the leading 
case that this Court has accepted as a standard. 
Unfortunately, however, the Trial Court determined that the prices were 
Trade Secrets, and the jury also concluded as part of their verdict that the 
pricing for various WEST products to various customers were trade secrets 
within the context of the Utah Trade Secrets Act. There was substantial 
evidence that these were not secrets to the extent that they were within the 
general purview of Keil's knowledge. The representatives of the three 
companies, as set forth above, testified that although they were told to protect 
the integrity of the prices, a good salesman could find out what their prices 
were either by simply asking them or by checking the general pricing rates 
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commonly used in the area. It was, however, the position of WEST, through 
Mr. Leaver, that the prices were proprietary and that Keil and customers were 
told not to disclose them to others. 
Notwithstanding the above, the critical issue is whether or not Keil's 
sending of the letters to Cargil, Mag Corp and Alliant Tech constituted a 
misappropriation of the Trade Secret. Here the evidence overwhelmingly 
mandates that the jury's verdict was erroneous. What is more problematic is 
that the Trial Court announced for the first time in its ruling on Defendants' 
post-trial motions, that the misappropriation was Keil's delivery of pricing 
information to Brody. 
The Trial Court ruled that Keil's informing Brody of his knowledge of 
WEST'S pricing constituted the misappropriation. This conclusion belies the 
fact that there was no evidence that Keil specifically told anyone at Brody what 
the prices were and in fact the only evidence was that Keil sent letters to his 
former customers telling each of them that he would beat WEST'S prices by 
10%. 
The Trial Courts ruling appears to be the ultimate example of judicial 
creativity. After hearing argument by Defendants in essentially five (5) 
different pre-trial, intra-trial and post-trial motions, the Trial Court, in an effort 
to sustain the jury's verdict and the Court's own determination in the case, 
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shifted its focus away from the three letters because it was clear the customers 
were not given information, whether it was a Trade Secret or not, that they 
didn't already know. The Trial Court effectively ruled, as a matter of law, that 
the delivery by defendant Keil of letters to AUiant Tech, Mag Corp and Cargill 
was not a misappropriation of Trade Secrets even though in its special verdict 
form (Addendum B) the Court did not specifically require the jury to 
determine the misappropriation of price quotes. 
The problem with this analysis is the only evidence the jury heard was 
the delivery of the three letters by Keil to the three companies. They heard no 
evidence of what Keil actually gave to Brody or what Keil did with Brody or 
what Brody knew. The Court, after having been asked to grant Summary 
Judgment on this issue on four different occasions, finally, in its decision 
denying Defendants' Motion for a New Trial ruled, as a matter of law, that 
Keil's delivery of the price list to Brody was in fact the misappropriation and 
not the delivery to WEST'S three customers. This theory was totally 
unsupported by the evidence and was never argued by the WEST'S to the jury. 
The Trial Court was given ample opportunity to implement this Court's 
ruling in the Interlocutory Appeal. In the absence of specific evidence of price 
lists and the distribution of them to individuals who did not know the prices, 
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there was simply not a misappropriation of a Trade Secret. In fact, whether or 
not a Trade Secret existed was not established by WEST. 
Finally, as further affirmation that the Utah Trade Secrets Act does not 
trump Muna, the Court is directed to the case of Envirotech Corp. vs. 
Callahan. 872 P. 2d 487 (Utah App 1994), a case that does indeed follow the 
legislative pronouncement of the Utah Trade Secrets Act. The opinion in that 
case refers liberally to the provisions of Muna and cites them with approbation. 
What is important in that case is that although the Court found there was a 
Trade Secret and that it had been misappropriated, it continued to cite Muna 
even after the enactment of the Utah Trade Secrets Act, as the controlling case 
in Utah. Thus both Envirotech and this Court's ruling in the Interlocutory 
Appeal specifically validated Muna. For the Trial Court to suggest that 
somehow the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act changed the playing field from 
Muna as a matter of law, is incorrect. Clearly applying Muna, the Trial Court 
should have found in the pre-trial motions or at least after the presentation of 
WEST'S case that there was no Trade Secret or, if it was, it had not been 
misappropriated. The Court's failure to do so constituted error and abuse of 
discretion and should be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE DID NOT PURPONDERATE AT TRIAL 
THAT THERE WAS A NEXUS BETWEEN THE ANY 
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ACTIVITY OF KEIL WITH CUSTOMERS OF WEST 
WHICH CAUSED DAMAGE TO WEST AND THE COURT 
FURTHER COMPOUNDED THE JURY ERROR BY 
FAILING BY FAILING EITHER TO DIRECT OR SET 
ASIDE THE VERDICT. 
The errors determined in Point I above pale in comparison to the failures 
of the Jury and the Trial Court to properly consider the issue of the alleged 
interference by the Defendants with economic relationships of WEST. The 
marshalling of all the evidence supporting Plaintiffs claim, revokes problems 
for WEST and the Trial Court. 
WEST's claim that Keil intentionally interfered with the economic 
relationships causing damages was limited to three customers Cargill, Mag 
Corp and Allaint Tech. The Trial Court determined, after the presentation of 
WEST'S case, that that there was no malicious, intentional interference, if at all, 
by Keil through Brody with WEST'S relationship with the three customers at 
issue. The only interference was the transmission of the Trade Secret, if in fact 
it was a Trade Secret. ( See the Trial Court's ruling in the Motion for a Directed 
Verdict.[Tp 290-93] Because the Trial Court specifically found that there wsa 
no malicious type interference, this ruling obviates any reliance upon Leigh 
Furniture and Carpet vs. Isom Supra. While this case deals with the tort of 
interference with a prospective business relationship, its discussion does deal 
28 
with the damage question or the question of economic interference in this case. 
What the Trial Court essentially said is that by Keil sending letters to Mag 
Corp, Alliant Tech and Cargill telling these people that he could beat WEST'S 
prices, he potentially interfered with WEST'S economic relations with its 
customers. 
The problem with this theory is that in marshaling all of the evidence pro 
and con, in this case, between what Keil did on behalf of himself and Brody 
and any damage WEST asserts. WEST failed to show that its loss of business 
was connected to Keil making an offer on behalf of Brody to the three 
customers. In fact, while Mr. Leaver testified that WEST had long term 
contracts with each of these three entities, he also acknowledged that nothing 
in the contracts prohibited these customers from purchasing products and 
services from someone else.[Tp. 22] In addition, all three of the 
representatives of the entities in question, Keith Rydalch, Bruce Henderson, 
and Kathleen Vigil testified that while price was one factor that always had to 
be considered, it was not the most important factor. They all agreed that the 
quality of service and products and the relationship with the service personnel 
were much more important than price alone. In fact, Mag Corp did not use the 
products and services of Brody and left WEST for other reasons as set forth in 
their own letter. [See Ex 20] Cargill in fact did do business with Brody until 
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November of 1999, and Alliant Tech did only 60 days worth of business with 
Brody. 
What is even more compelling in this discussion is that the President of 
WEST-California, Brent William Chettle, called by WEST testified that there 
were no price sheets for WEST products, but that prices were established as a 
product of negotiation. [Tp 268] Specifically, he indicated that the primary 
considerations with respect to competition in the industry for products and 
services were the quality of the products and the quality of service. He stated 
that, "Pricing I feel is secondary, it's an important factor to many customers, 
but in some cases if the pricing becomes such an important consideration it 
tends to impact upon the quality that can be delivered to those particular 
clients. So, while it may be important to some companies, pricing to us 
(meaning WEST) is not nearly that critical." [Tp 267]. Therefore, according to 
Plaintiffs own witness although pricing is important, it is not critical and none 
of the three claimed entities to whom WEST tied its damages indicated that the 
pricing suggested by Keil in his letters made the difference in their decisions 
either to leave WEST or go with Brody. Without the nexus between the price 
and either the lost client or the benefit, there is no tortious interference with 
prospective business relationships and, therefore, there is no damage. 
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A thorough review of the evidence in this case shows that WEST did 
not meet its burden either to the jury or to the Trial Court in various motions, to 
demonstrate the appropriate measure of damages was. While there is not a 
specific reference to the measure of damages in a Trade Secrets case in this 
jurisdiction, this Court is directed to the following cases from other 
jurisdictions, all of which wrestle with the problem of damages in Trade Secret 
cases. The earliest case is International Industries vs. Warm Petroleum 248 F 
2.d 696 (1957 ). This case arose from the United States District Court in 
Delaware. In that case, the Court makes the following statement 
the appropriate measure of damages in analyzing this to a 
patent infringement is not what plaintiff lost but rather the 
benefit, profits or advantage gained by the defendant in the use of 
the Trade Secret Id. at 699. 
More recently, in the case of Universal Computing Company vs, Lykes 
Youngstown Corporation , 504 F 2.d 518 (1974) the Court, in dealing with a 
misappropriation of the computer system, relied on the International Industry 
case and cited with approval this language, 
Certain standards do emerge from the cases. The defendant 
must have actually put the Trade Secrets to some commercial use. 
The law protecting Trade Secrets is essentially designed to 
regulate unfair business competition. If the defendant enjoyed 
actual profits a type of restitutionary remedy can be afforded the 
Plaintiff, either recovering the full total of the defendants profits 
or some proportional amount designed to correspond to the actual 
contribution of the plaintiffs success. Because the primary 
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concern in most cases is to measure the value to the defendant of 
what he actually obtained from the plaintiff, the proper measure is 
to calculate what the parties would have agreed to as a fair price 
for licensing the defendant to put the Trade Secret to use. Id. at 
539 
The focus, therefore, should be on the benefit to the Defendants not what 
WEST purportedly lost. Using this theory, the Defendants' sales to Alliant 
Tech were $27, 724.00 and to Cargill were $10,960.00. 60% of those figures, 
(the percentage WEST used to measure profit) totals $16,634.40 and the 
$6,576.00 respectively. 
WEST'S reliance upon the fact it lost essentially a years worth of 
business based upon previous years earnings was improper. In this case 
WEST'S damages were based upon a percentage of the profits from previous 
year's contracts and the expectation that its service and products would be 
supplied in a like manner for the next year. While this may be a reasonable 
assumption, it was refuted by all three of the customers who indicated that 
these were not adhesion or exclusive contracts and they were free to purchase 
other products and services at any time. In fact, Mag Corp did just that. Prior 
to Keil leaving WEST, Mag Corp. became dissatisfied with WEST'S boiler 
products. 
No evidence was presented of a reasonable likelihood that decisions 
made by the two companies who did go with Brody (Cargill and Alliant Tech) 
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were based upon price. As price was the only Trade Secret purportedly 
misappropriated, damages can not flow unless there is a specific nexus between 
the tw o. None was prov en b\ WEST. 
The entirety of the WEST'S testimony with respect to damages came 
from Mr. Lever, the local president of WEST. Trial Ex. 29 (which was later 
amended when the Trial Court struck all but Alliant Tech, Mag Corp and 
Cargill as the three customers directly related to this action) was prepared by 
Mr. Leaver showing the basis for damages. Mr. Leaver testified that Keil had 
sought out and developed agreements wL' J. 'V*-.* •/wpa::1^ A •':; r WEST. 
Lever testified that there was an expectation that WEST u .1 T 4 , r; : to 
service these clients through 1998 and 1999.[Tp. 42-44 and 54] Ex. 22, 23 and 
24 were introduced to show the ledger sheets of Alliant Tech, Cargill and 
Magcorp, respectively. Mr. Leaver testified that these represented the services 
and products utilized by each of these three companies in 1997. 
With respect to Alliant I ech, Mi I ,eav ei testified that in February of 
1998, he h.-vi received a two year purchase order a nd based upoi 1 that order and 
previous sales, the anticipated gross sales for the two year period( 1998-1999) 
would be $136,419.48. The gross profit margin was 60% thus the damage 
figure of $81,851.69 as referenced on Exhibit 29. With respect to MagCorp, 
Mr. Leaver testified similarly, WEST'S anticipated gross sales of $167,417.25 
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at a 63% profit margin resulting in damages of $105,472.87. The same 
expectation existed for Cargil based upon previous contracts. Results in 
damages of $6,391.62, Ex. 29. 
It is important to note, however, that in the same testimony, Mr. Leaver 
also said that none of the purchase orders or the contracts WEST had with the 
three companies were exclusive agreements. That is to say, they did not bind 
these companies to purchasing certain products at a certain rate for a certain 
period of time. The following colloquy between Counsel for Brody and Mr. 
Leaver is critical: 
"Question: That figure is based on an assumption on your part that 
Alliant Tech was going to continue to deal with West? 
Answer: I don't believe that's an assumption. I had an example, and 
exhibit here as well as a two year purchase order they'd just given us in 
February of 1998. 
Question: But that didn't bind Alliant Tech to buy exclusively from 
WEST, did it? 
Answer: No, but the previous experience is they bought exclusively from 
WEST. 
Question: But the answer is no. 
Answer: Answer no to what. 
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Question: That it was, it did not prevent them from buying from 
someone else. 
Ansv ei : Ofr iously that's tn le. 
Question: This is not a contract where they agree in writing to buy only 
from you. Answer: That is correct. 
Question: And if they got a better price from someone else, there was 
nothing to prohibit them from buying the product if they felt it would do the 
job for them at a better pi: Ice. 
Ai iswer: That's correct ,f [Tp. 71 -72] 
The same discussion took place with respect to Mag Corp and Cargill. 
Even with respect to the damage claim for Keil's salary, a question was asked 
in terms of the formulation in arriving at the $25,000 figure, (Ex. 29) 
"Question: Is there any kind of a formula that you used in order to do that, or 
was it a seat of the pants calculation? 
Ai. •. \ ! • < v * • . . . *" v- • 
commissions, because he made sales which the company profited from, and we 
had taken off the taxes and they were related to the commission. 
Question: So that was just an arbitrary determination on your part as to 
how you'd handle that, is that a fair statement. 
Answer: That's a fai r statement." [ I P 14 ] 
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In essence, then WEST's damage claim fails in three respects: First there 
is no nexus between what Keil did and the failure of Alliant Tech, Mag Corp 
and Cargill to continue to purchase products from WEST. Second, there was 
no binding contractual agreement for any of these customers to continue to 
purchase products at a certain rate from WEST for any finite period of time. 
Third, the damage amounts are totally speculative in that they are based on 
prior purchase orders with no guarantee of future business. 
Finally, and most importantly and as supported by the cases hereinbefore 
cited, there was no evidence that Brody or Keil profited from any of the 
transactions with these parties except to the extent of gross sales of $27,724 to 
Alliant Tech and $10,960 to Cargill. This information was set forth in Plaintiffs 
Exhibit F and G appended to Defendants' memorandums supporting Motion for 
a New Trial, R. 1994 at 2015 and 2017. At the very least, if WESTs pricing 
was a Trade Secret, and if it was misappropriated, and if it was delivered to 
someone who didn't know WEST'S prices and all of those things were 
concluded by a preponderance of the evidence, under the cases cited above, the 
only damages WEST is entitled to is 60% of $27,724 + $10,960 or $23,210. 
Defendants firmly believe that the jury believed Keil's relationship with 
Brody, prior to his termination with WEST was inappropriate. The evidence 
presented by WEST's demonstrated that five months before Keil terminated his 
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employment with WEST Keil entered into discussions with representatives of 
Brody conceniing possible employmenl Keil was weighing whether or not he 
could profitably change jobs and therefore, inquired ah ail the ability of Brody 
to provide products of a similar quality to WEST'S products at competitive 
prices so that Keil could continue to make the type of living he was 
accustomed to working for WEST. [Tp. 319-320] 
Keil testified tt lat in October of 1997, Jim Wilson, the sales manager of 
Brody, contacted hi m ai id discussions ensued about Keil's interest in going to 
work with Brody. Tp. 316. Keil, testified thai at the time he was not 
particularly interested in leaving WEST, but if the proposition was attractive 
enough he would consider it. [Tp 319] He also had conversations with Jon 
Liddiard, the President of Brody, and was offered commissions and stock in the 
company as part of a potential employment package. While there was not an 
actual agreement reached, there v\ ere ongoing discussions, [1 p 321 322.] Keil 
also admitted that, consistent with Jim Wilsoi i's trial testimony, between 
October of 1997 and February of 1998, he became involved with a company 
known as Buckman Laboratories, who was assisting Brody with their product 
line. Keil contacted Buckman to determine whether it could provide products 
to enhance Brody's product line and be competitive with WEST [Tp 323.] He 
acknowledged that talking with Buckman was prepatory to making a 
^7 
commitment to Brody. [Tp 324] Keil then began discussions of his potential 
move with Greg Offerman who also worked with WEST and the two of them 
met with Jon Liddiard in early January of 1998, to discuss the fact that Keil had 
been assured by Buckman that Brody could compete with WEST'S products 
and at that point pricing became an issue [Tp 326] At that time neither Keil or 
Offerman were employees of Brody and were still employees of WEST. 
After Keil initially reviewed Brody's price list he determined that 
Brody's prices were not competitive with WEST. Keil advised Mr. Liddiard 
that he was not inclined to leave WEST. Mr. Liddiard responded by advising 
Keil that he would have more flexibility in determining prices and with that, 
Keil determined that he would make the move from WEST to Brody. [Tp. 328-
329] Keil acknowledged that he did not leave in February, and waited until 
early March because he did not want to notify existing customers that he was 
leaving WEST and that he could sell competitive products at comparable prices 
for his new company, until he was actually terminated from WEST. [Tp 329] 
He did, however, prepare a letter, on his own computer, dated February 18, 
1998 to Cargill Flour on Brody Chemical stationery, [Exhibit 11 in the Trial], 
in which Cargill was advised that he, Keil, was moving to Brody and discussed 
prices and products. Keil testified, however, that although the date of the 
Exhibit was February 18th it was not delivered until after Keil left WEST. It 
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was delivered directly to Mr. Henderson on ui about the 9 ' or 10 ]l of Mai eh 
[Tp 33 1. | Tins was corroborated by Henderson's testimony in the Trial 
proceedings. [Tp 184] 
There is no doubt in Defendants' mind, however, that the jury believed, 
as did the Trial Judge, that Keil and Brody's conduct in the months between 
October of 1997 and March 5, 1998 were inappropriate in some way. T u jury 
was notinstructec w. ,:,c ;.:o • ; ^ JAVS or .ho-. .vrraer- or di-cus^i-•?> were 
improper, Defendants believe that this poisoned the well with respect to both 
the Courts and the jury's analysis of whether some liability should attach to the 
Defendants for WEST'S loss of the three customers, Cargill, Alliant Tech and 
Mag Corp. 
Plaintiff could have cured this entire problem by utilizing a non-compete 
agreement. Plaintiff knew it, tl le Defendants knew it, the jury and the J udge 
knew it =:obviously, the Trial j •. urt failed to consider its importance. There 
are many business situations in which employers, who hire potentially valuable 
employees to develop customers and business, require, as part of initial 
employment, that employees sign what is known throughout the trade as a non-
competition agreement. These agreements limit the kinds of activities 
employees can not engage in \ \ they leav e ei i lployment. These agreements 
traditionally ' In nit ti le abil ity of the employee to compete with the former 
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company, by type of activity, area, and length of time. As Mr. Leaver testified 
in this case, no such agreement was ever made between Keil and WEST. A 
non-competition agreement could have protected WEST against precisely what 
Keil in this case. Keil helped to develop WEST'S business by the sheer force 
of his personality, dedication and technical expertise thereby ingratiating 
himself with certain customers. He then attempting to take those customers 
with him when he left WEST'S employment. A non-competition agreement 
would have solved WEST'S problem. 
WEST forfeited the most effective remedy it had to prevent what 
happened here, and then spent the entirety of the litigation process trying to 
make a round peg fit into a square hole by claiming misappropriation of Trade 
Secrets and interference with economic relationships to obtain damages from 
the Defendants. The analysis of evidence had to be tortured by both the jury 
and the Trial Judge to arrive at the result which is contrary to the law, contrary 
to the evidence, and contrary to standard business practices. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court, after sending a clear signal in its Interlocutory Appeal 
Decision as to the limitations of WEST'S causes of action, should not now 
allow its initial decision to be weakened by what happened in the Trial in this 
case. What is even more compelling is that, notwithstanding the jury's 
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inability to apply the facts to the law, the Trial Court Judge was given ample 
opportunity both prior Lo during and post-trial to resolve these issues in an 
appropriate manner He chose not to do M\ fuilher eompvunding the error. 
This Court should now complete the work it began,,,, i n the Interlocutory 
Appeal by ruling, as a matter of law, that WEST'S pricing was not a Trade 
Secret, that the sending of letters by Keil to existing customers, who already 
knew WEST'S prices was not an misappropriation of a Trade Secret and that 
there is no nexus betweei 1 what Defendai:* - c, . Mis case to any damage 
suffered b} - W EST with respect to the *:v - • * ';;vr- r^iia.,}::^ . ,;e 
litigation. Notwithstanding the above, if there was damage leasure 
thereof should be based upon the gain received by Brody not any purported 
loss by WEST. 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court should reverse the decision of 
tlle I rial Court and enter a judgment of no cause of action or, in the alternative, 
to •-' -- "• reduce WESTs judgment to $23,210.40. 
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Ah 
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Attorney for Brody I 1/ (y 
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ADDENDUM A 
I l l If r~ & ^f 
This opinion is subject to revision before ftnal ' 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Water & Energy Systems No. 980250 
Technology, Inc., 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
u E D 
Steven L. Keil, 
Defendant and Appellant. February 19, 1999 
Second District Court, Farmington Dep't 
The Honorable Rodney S. Page 
Attorneys: Joseph C. Rust, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Thomas R. Blonquist, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice: 
11 We granted appellant Steven Keil's petition for an 
interlocutory appeal from the district court's grant of a 
preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiff Water & Energy 
Systems Technology, Inc. ("WEST"). 
12 For approximately twelve years prior to March 2, 1998, 
>Keil worked for WEST as a water treatment chemical salesman. 
Keil voluntarily terminated his employment with WEST on March 2, 
1998, and accepted a similar sales position with one of WEST'S 
competitors, Brody Chemical ("Brody"). Keil did not have an 
employment contract with WEST nor did he sign a covenant not to 
compete with WEST should he terminate his employment with them. 
In the month prior to leaving WEST, Keil made several service 
calls for Brody and researched the availability of chemical 
ingredients for some of Brody's products. Keil also had meetings 
with Brody to discuss the viability of Brody's plans to increase 
its presence in the water treatment chemical business. During 
fchose meetings, Brody assured Keil that Brody's products could 
compete with WEST'S. 
13 While working for WEST, Keil had access to the formulae 
and prices for WEST'S water treatment chemicals. During his 
employment, Keil derived most of his commissions from sales of 
water treatment chemicals to Hill Air Force Base, Alliant 
Technologies, Laidlaw, Magnesium Corporation, Utah State 
University and E. G. & G. Immediately after leaving WEST'S 
employ, Keil contacted the above clients to solicit their 
business for Brody, claiming that Brody's products were "very 
similar" to WEST'S. 
14 On March 9, 1998, WEST filed a complaint against Keil 
in district court alleging misappropriation of trade secrets. 
WEST claimed that Keil had misappropriated WEST'S formulae and 
prices for its water treatment chemicals and supplied them to 
Brody, thereby giving Brody and Keil an unfair competitive 
advantage over WEST. At the time it filed the complaint, WEST 
also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Keil 
from contacting the six major clients he had while working for 
WEST and to prohibit Keil from disclosing to Brody any 
confidential information obtained from WEST. The district court 
heard and granted WEST'S motion for preliminary injunction. Keil 
then filed a motion for relief from the preliminary injunction 
and for a new trial. The district court heard and denied Keil's 
motion. Keil then filed a petition seeking permission to file an 
interlocutory appeal from the district court's grant of the 
preliminary injunction. That petition was granted. 
15 In this appeal, Keil asserts that the district court 
erred in granting WEST'S motion for a preliminary injunction 
because WEST failed to meet its burden of showing that (1) WEST 
would suffer irreparable harm unless the injunction issued, 
(2) the injury to WEST substantially outweighs the damage the 
injunction would cause Keil, and (3) WEST is likely to succeed on 
the merits of the underlying action. 
16 We will not disturb a district court's grant of a 
preliminary injunction unless the district court abused its 
discretion or rendered a decision against the clear weight of the 
evidence. See Kasco Services Corp, v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86, 90 
(Utah 1992) (citing Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 
421, 425 (Utah 1983)) . 
17 Rule 65A(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets 
forth the elements that must be present before a preliminary 
injunction may issue: 
(1) The applicant will suffer 
irreparable harm unless the order or 
injunction issues; 
vr^ QQOOqn 2 
business, formulae and prices are usually proprietary and held 
confidential. 
511 However, WEST failed to establish that Keil copied 
its prices or its products and supplied them to Brody. At the 
hearing, Keil introduced copies of Brody's formulae and Keil's 
best recollection of WEST'S chemical formulae. The formulae are 
not identical. Furthermore, Keil's expert testified that 
although the formulae are somewhat similar, there are significant 
differences between Brody's and WEST'S formulae. Loretitsch 
explained that Brody's formulae differ from WEST'S in three ways. 
First, the individual ingredients in the formulae are different 
chemicals. Second, the percentages of the individual chemicals 
present in each formula are different. Finally, the ratios of 
the individual components with respect to each other in Brody's 
formulae are not the same as in WEST'S The expert then opined 
that Brody's formulae are not copied from WEST'S. He then 
accounted for the similarities between WEST and Brody formulae by 
explaining that to some extent all the chemical formulations in 
this industry are driven by market and regulatory forces. 
212 In contrast, WEST neither submitted its formulae 
to the trial court nor did it supply a price sheet. The court 
was forced to rely on Keil's best guess as to WEST'S formulae and 
WEST'S representation that the prices were the same. WEST did 
not introduce any expert testimony regarding whether Brody's 
formulae had in fact been copied from WEST. WEST relied on the 
self-serving statements of its president, Frank Leaver, who 
stated that Brody sold "almost duplicate products" after Keil 
began working for them. Notably, however, Leaver did not testify 
that Brody's formulae were copies of WEST'S. 
113 In addition to his expert's testimony, Keil 
introduced evidence illustrating that the water treatment 
chemical industry is relatively easy to break into. Several 
industry publications set forth suggested general chemical make-
ups for water treatment chemicals. Both Keil and Brody president 
John Liddiard described how Brody arrived at the formulations for 
its products through consultation with Buckman Laboratories and 
affirmed that it did not copy its formulae from WEST. 
514 Finally, the district court's own findings support 
our conclusion that the injunction was improperly granted. The 
court's findings indicate that it believed WEST'S formulae, 
although not exact duplicates, were uvery similar" to Brody's. 
Similarities which can be explained by industry or regulatory 
cTemands cannot suffice to meet the requirement that Brody copied 
WEST'S confidential formulae, especially in light of the abundant 
testimony that the formulae were not copied and the substantial 
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(2) The threshold injury to the 
applicant outweighs whatever damage the 
proposed order or injunction may cause the 
party restrained or enjoined. 
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, 
would not be adverse to the public interest; 
and 
(4) There is a substantial likelihood 
that the applicant will prevail on the merits 
of the underlying claim, or the case presents 
serious issues on the merits which should be 
the subject of further litigation. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e) (1998). Because we are persuaded that 
WEST failed to meet its burden under subsection four above, we 
reverse the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction. 
58 To meet the requirements of subsection four, an 
applicant must, at the very least, make a prima facie showing 
that the elements of its underlying claim can be proved. See 
Utah State Road Common v. Fribera, 687 P.2d 821, 833 (Utah 1984) 
(suggesting that prima facie showing of the elements of the 
underlying claim is required for issuance of preliminary 
injunction) ; see also Schwalm Elecs. Inc. v. Electrical Prods. 
Corp., 302 N.E.2d 394, 397 (111. App. Ct. 1973) (stating prima 
facie case of misappropriation of trade secrets is necessary to 
support issuance of an injunction); Paramount Office Supply Co. 
v. D. A. Maclsaac, Inc. 524 A.2d 1099, 1101 (R.I. 1987) 
(requiring prima facie evidence of misappropriation of customer 
list prior to ordering injunction). 
19 To establish a claim for misappropriation of trade 
secrets, WEST must show (1) the existence of a trade secret, 
(2) communication of the trade secret to Keil under an express or 
implied agreement limiting disclosure of the secret, and 
(3) Keil's use of the secret that injures WEST. See 
Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697-98 
(Utah 1981) . "An employer to obtain relief must establish that 
his former employee's product is a copy of his own product." Id. 
at 696 (emphasis added). 
510 Arguably, WEST established that its prices and 
formulae for its water treatment chemicals were secret and that 
it had an implied agreement with Keil limiting disclosure of the 
prices and formulae. In fact, even Keil's expert, Gary 
Loretitsch, testified that in the water treatment chemical 
3 No. 980250 
amount of information in the public domain regarding water 
treatment chemicals. WEST had the burden of producing evidence 
that would establish that its formulae were in fact stolen by 
Keil for use by Brody. It is hard to see how this burden could 
possibly have been met when WEST never submitted actual formulae 
to the trial court for comparison purposes. 
115 In light of the foregoing, we find that the 
district court's grant of the preliminary injunction was against 
the clear weight of the evidence. WEST did not meet its burden 
of establishing a prima facie case that Keil copied confidential 
information and supplied that information to Brody. 
Consequently, we reverse the district court's grant of a 
preliminary injunction. 
Chief Justice Howe, Justice Stewart, Justice Zimmerman, 
and Justice Russon concur in Associate Chief Justice Durham's 
opinion. 
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ADDENDUM B 
JOSEPH C. RUST (2835) 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-8000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WATER & ENERGY SYSTEMS 
TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Utah corporation, : JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
: Civil No. 980700090CV 
STEVEN L. KEIL; and BRODY CHEMICAL : Judge Rodney S. Page 
INC., a Utah corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
This case having come on for jury trial before the Honorable Rodney S. Page beginning on 
March 1,2000 at the hour of 9:00 a.m. and continuing through to March 3,2000, and Defendants' 
Motion for Direct Verdict having been denied, and the jury having heard the evidence and the 
arguments of counsel and having been instructed on the law by the Court, and the jury having 
returned its verdict as follows: 
1. Were the customer price quotes a trade secret? Yes. 
2. Did Steven Keil misappropriate the price quotes? Yes 
JUDGMENT ENTERED 
FILED 
MAY - 5 2000 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
3. Did Steven Keil intentionally interfere with a prospective economic relationship of 
Plaintiff with Alliant and/or MagCorp., and/or Cargill? Yes. 
4. Did the actions of Steven Keil result in damage to the Plaintiff? Yes. 
5. Was Steven Keil acting as an agent for Brody Chemical when he misappropriated the 
price quotes and contacted Plaintiffs consumers? Yes. 
6. The amount of damages sustained by the Plaintiff as a result of Defendant KeiFs 
actions: lost profits -$190,000, unearned salary and benefits paid-$4,706. 
7. Does Plaintiff owe any sums to Mr. Keil for commissions, unpaid salary or expenses? 
Yes. 
8. The amount Plaintiff owes Defendant Keil- $4231.00 for commissions; $300.00 for 
expenses, and $1500.00 for salary, for a total of $6,031.00. 
NOW, THEREFORE it is HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
Plaintiff Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. is awarded judgment against Defendants, 
jointly and severally, in the amount of $188,675.00 together with Plaintiffs costs. 
DATED this M-K day of May. 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
P 
HONORABLE RODNEYSPAGE 





+Z25 SQM± 6200 Wesc 
P.O. Bo.x 18747 
Szlz Late City. Uzzh 84118-0747 
OFFICE: (801) 963-2436 FAX: (80L) 963-2437 
March 3, 1998 
Mr. Keith Rydslch 
Magnesium Corporation of America 
Rcwiey, Utah 
Dear Keith, 
I have enjoyed our relationship dur~.g the t ime I served you as a representative of 
W.E.S.T., inc. ! have made a change, arse I n o w represent Brcdy Chemical 
I have made this change for many rezszes. A number of these are beneficial to you, ! can 
new provide you greaser support resources and a substantially lower cost for the technical 
service and the wster treatment products. T n e additional lattrajde and support I now enjoy 
will enhance the (eve! of service f can provide you. 
T n e water treatment products that I will supply -are. essentially the same as those I have 
supplied in the pasr, and that have provided you wkh excellent resufts. However, these 
products will now come WTLH three s:gnmcant advantages: "first, the cooling tower inhibitor 
wii! have an increased amount of mofybdate, but a d^creassd amount of phosphate t o 
eliminate caJcum phosphate deposition without sacrifidng corrosion protection; • second, 
Iogisrics wiii be Improved * because the manufacturing and warehousing feclices a re in Sait 
Lake Ozy; and, third, the cost will be subszaniiaify lower beczjjse. of the lower product 
cost, and the lower-freight: cost 
Over the years I have ser^d you, i have developed an extensive knowledge of your 
systems and operations. ! have also developed a good working relationship with your 
personnel. My connnueing cbjec±ve wii! be t o provide you superior protection for your 
systems by applying optimal treatment products, state of the an controf and application 
methods, and competent and dedicated technical service. Kehh, I value your business 
highly, and I look forward to continuing our relationship and to serving you in the, -future. 
Sincerely, I PLAINTIFFS 
^ t e v e Keil | a 1 ? 
• SALT L A X C CITY. UTAH - LOS A.NGHLE5. CALIFORNIA - DH.WEX COLORADO • S A N Dl£CO, CALIFORNIA - BOlSc. IDAHO -
- SA> FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA - PHOENTX ARIZONA • 
BR#DY 
CHEMICAL 
—'825 South 6200 West 
.0, Box 18747 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118-0747 
OFFICE. (801) 963-2436 FAX. (801) 963-2437 
March 3, 1998 
Ms. Kathy Vigil 
AJliant Techsystems.lnc. 
P.O. Box 98 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Dear Kathy, 
I have enjoyed our relationship during the time I have served you as a representative 
of W.E.S.T., Inc. I have made a change, and I now represent Brody Chemical. 
1 have made this change for many reasons. A number of these are beneficial to you. 
I can now provide you greater support resources and a substantially lower cost for 
the technical service and the water treatment products. The additional lattrtude and 
support I now enjoy will enhance the level of service I can provide you. 
The water treatment products that I will supply are essentially the same as those I 
have supplied in the past, and that have provided you with remarkable results. 
However, these products will now come with two'significant advantages: first, 
logistics will be improved because the manufacturing and warehousing facilities are 
in Salt Lake Crty, and, second, the cost will be substantially lower because of the 
lower product cost, and the lower freight cost. 
The following is a list of the W.E.S.T. products I have utilized in treating your systems 
and the pricing, and the corresponding Brody Chemical products and. pricing. The 
effectiveness and use rates will be essentially the same, so you can see thac the 
savings will be substantial. The freight savings will provide an additional cost reduction 
of $0.06 to $0.12 per pound. In total the cost reduction will be more than 




























Please keep this information confidential. 
Over the years I nave served you, I have developed an extensive knowledge of your 
systems and operations. I have also developed a good working relationship with 
your personnel. As in the past, my objective will be to provide you superior 
protection for your systems by applying optimal treatment products, state of the art 
control and application methods, and competent and dedicated technical service. 
Kathy, I value your business highly, and I look forward to continuing our relationship 








Tat aax^ S2i-3S4a Er. u& 
March 3, 1953 
Mr. Bruce Henderson 
Cargill Rcur Miffing 
2780 G Avenue 
O£}enTUteh8440l 
Dear Bruce, 
I hsve enjoyed our relationship during me time i servea you as a representative of 
W.E.S.T., Inc. I have made a change, and ! new represent Ercdy Chemical, 
I have made this change fer many reasons/ A number of these-are" beneficial to you. 
I can now provide ycu greater support resources and a substantially lower-cost fer 
the technics service and the water fresanent products. The additional-[attitude and 
support I now enjoy will enhance the leveJ. of service I can provide you. 
The water treatment products that 1 will supply are essentially the same as those 1 
have supplied in the past, and that have provided' you with remarkable results,-
However, these products wffl-now come with''two..-significant advantages: first, 
logistics will be improved because the manufacturing and-warehc j^sing-1sdffes-ang. 
in Safe Lake Oty, and, second, the cost will be substantially lower, because of the 
tower product cost, and .the Sower frei^rt cost 
The following is a list of the WEST, products 1 have-L^Tized in'treating your systems, 
and -the pricing, and the corresponding Brccy Chemical products and pricing.- The 
effectiveness -and use ratss will -be essentially the same, so you -can see that the 
savings will be substantia'. The freight saving will provide an additional cost reduction 
of $0.12 to $0.16 per pound. In total the cost reduction will be mere than twenty 
I . EXHIBIT 
1 i a 
• SALT LAKH crrr. LTAK • 10s ANGELES, CALIFORNIA • D£.vvs3L COLORADO - SAN DIECO, CALIFORNIA - aocsE. IDAHO «• 
• SAN F2JLXGSC3 CALIFORNIA • PHOENIX ARIZONA • 
CHEMICAL 
^ 5 South. 6200 West 
. Box 18747 
sic Lake City. Utah. 84-118-0747 

























Please keep this information confictential. 
O^erthe years I have served you, I have developed-an-extensive knowledge-of your 
systems and operations, f have also developed-a gocd..woridng relationship with' 
your personnel. As in the past, my objective will be to provide you superior 
protection for your systems by applying optimal treatment products, state of the art 
control and application-methods, and competent and dedicated technical service. 
Bruce, 1 value your business hi^riy, and I- look forward-to continuing our relattonship-




SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
WATER & ENERGY SYSTEMS 
TECHNOLOGY, INC , A Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs), 
vs. 
STEVEN L. KETL and BRODY 
CHEMICAL, A Utah corporation, 
Defendant(s). 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 980700090 
Comes now the Court and having reviewed Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and their Memorandum submitted in support thereof and Plaintiffs Memorandum and Affidavit 
submitted in opposition thereto and having heard the arguments of counsel and being fully 
advised in the premises hereby rules as follows: 
The Court concludes that there is sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could 
conclude that the formula and price list of Plaintiff were confidential and Defendant Keil was 
under an express or implied contract which limited their disclosure. However, in order for the 
Plaintiff to prevail on their claim of misappropriation of Plaintiff s formula, Plaintiff has to prove 
that the formulas were the same or that Brody's formulas were specifically derived from those of 
the Plaintiff. 
No such credible evidence has been provided either by testimony at the prior hearing or 
by subsequent affidavit. For that reason, the Court grants Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment on the issue of the misappropriation of the formulae. 
The Court further concludes that there remains a question of fact as to the 
misappropriation of Plaintiffs price list and as to whether Plaintiffs price lists were used by 
Defendant Keil and Brody in establishing their own price lists. Therefore, the Court hereby 
denies Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of misappropriation of the price 
lists and causes of action for interference with economic relationships and violation of the Trade 
Secrets Act. 
Defendant's counsel is to prepare Judgment in accordance with the Court's Ruling and 
submit the same to opposing counsel at least 5 days prior to the time it is submitted to the Court 
for signature. 
Dated this Z&< day of July, 1999. 
By the Court: 
ADDENDUM E 
JOSEPH C. RUST (2835) 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-8000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WATER & ENERGY SYSTEMS 
TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Utah corporation, : ORDER ON MOTIONS 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
: Civil No. 980700090CV 
STEVEN L. KEIL; and BRODY CHEMICAL : Judge Rodney S. Page 
INC., a Utah corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
Defendant Brody Chemical's Motion for Leave to File Motion for Summary Judgment Out 
of Time, Brody's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Keil's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and Plaintiff WEST'S two Motions to Compel having all come on for hearing before the Honorable 
Rodney S. Page on the 30th day of November, 1999 at the hour of 10:30 a.m., and the Plaintiff being 
represented by its counsel Joseph C. Rust, and Defendant Steven Keil being represented by his 
counsel John Caine, and Defendant Brody being represented by its counsel Thomas R. Blonquist, 
DEC 1 fi
 B 9 9 
and the Court having reviewed the Memoranda submitted by counsel, other documents filed with 
the Court, as well as the Court file, and having heard oral arguments, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendant Brody Chemical's Motion to File Motion for Summary Judgment Out of Time 
is granted; 
2. Defendant Brody Chemical's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied on the basis that there 
remain contested material issues of fact; 
3. Defendant Steven Keil's Motion for Summary Judge is denied on the basis that there remain 
contested material issues of fact; 
4. Plaintiff WEST'S Motion to Compel information concerning Cargill and Union Pacific, and 
specifically communications with and sales to, is hereby granted. Defendants are to supply 
the information by December 30, 1999. 
5. The trial date is vacated and the new trial date is set for Wednesday, February 23, 1999. 
6. On Plaintiffs Trade Secrets Claims, Plaintiff will not be entitled to reference any customers 
other than Mag Corp, EG & G, Union Pacific, Hill Air Force Base, Utah State University, 
Cargill Flour, Laidlaw and Alliant TechSystems. 
7. Each of the parties is to immediately submit to each other copies of their price sheets which 
they submitted in camera to the Court. Such documents will be held confidential by 
opposing counsel, shall be available for review only by the parties and their respective 
2 
expert witnesses and counsel, and all copies shall be subject to continuing requirements of 
confidentiality, namely, that such documents shall be held by the Coun and protected in 
strict confidentiality, and returned to Plaintiff at the conclusion of trial. 
DATED this 1 5 ^ day of December, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
SffiY S. PAGE HONORABLE RODN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered by the method indicated below a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER ON MOTIONS, in Civil No. 980700090CV, postage prepaid, this 
Jp^day of December, 1999, to: 
FEDERAL EXPRESS 






Thomas R. Blonquist 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
John Caine 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
2568 Washington Blvd., #200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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ADDENDUM F 
JOSEPH C. RUST (2835) 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-8000 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WATER & ENERGY SYSTEMS 
TECHNOLOGY, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STEVEN L. KEIL and BRODY CHEMICAL 
INC., a Utah corporation. 
Defendant. 
Defendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Motion for a New Trial or 
Amendment of Verdict, and Motion for Remittitur having come on for hearing before the Honorable 
Judge Rodney S. Page, on the 2nd day of May. 2000, at the hour of 10:15 a.m., and Plaintiff being 
represented by its counsel, Joseph C. Rust, Defendant Brody Chemical being represented by its 
counsel, Thomas R. Blonquist, and Defendant Stephen L. Keil being represented by his counsel, 
,nn,cTPaCT COU^ 
c-£C0HU 
P fc *° 
UKJLULK 
Civil No. 980700090CV 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
John T. Caine, and the Court having reviewed the Memoranda submitted by the parties and having 
heard the arguments of counsel, the Court finds and rules as follows: 
FINDINGS 
1. The misappropriation of confidential information by Defendants took place not in the 
disclosure of Plaintiff s WEST pricing to its own customers but rather in the disclosure of WEST 
pricing to Defendant Brody Chemical, an entity separate from Defendant Keil, for the purpose of 
Brody Chemical to compete with WEST. 
2. By Defendant Keil giving that confidential information to Defendant Brody 
Chemical, the trade secret was destroyed. 
3. The pricing information provided to Defendant Brody Chemical did not come from 
Plaintiff WEST'S customers but rather directly from Defendant Keil. 
4. The damages awarded by the jury were fair and reasonable, and in keeping with the 
evidence presented at trial. 
5. The case of Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982) 
is relevant as to setting the standards by which the tort of interference with a business relationship 
is determined. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendants' Motions and each of them are hereby denied. 
2 
^ 
2. Plaintiffs costs in the amount of $1986.09 are approved, there having been no 
objection to the same filed within five (5) days of May 2,2000. 
DATED this 3\ ^ day of May, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
XJ - W 
HONORABLE JUDGE RODNEY S. PAGE 1*=Z-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered by the method indicated below a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, in Civil No. 980700090CV, postage prepaid, this \$°^ 
day of May, 2000, to: 
FEDERAL EXPRESS 




( / U 
Thomas R. Blonquist 
40 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
John Caine 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
2568 Washington Blvd., #200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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